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ABSTRACT 
        Most of modern malware are packed by packers which automatically generate a lot of 
obfuscation techniques to defeat the anti-virus software. To identify packer, most of industry 
approaches still adopt the well-known technique of signature matching which can be easily 
evaded. This paper studies the new approach of applying a statistical approach to tackle this 
problem. We propose a new weight for extracting what obfuscation techniques might be more 
favourable in packers. We call it obfuscation technique frequency-inverse packer frequency 
(       ). As the term implies,         calculates values for each obfuscation techniques in a 
packer through an inverse proportion of the frequency of the obfuscation technique in a 
particular packer to the percentage of packers the obfuscation technique appears in. Obfuscation 
techniques with high         value show a strong relationship with the packer they appear in. 
Based on this weight, packer is represented by a vector of        . Then the used packer is 
identified by measuring the similarity between vectors of packer and targeted file. For checking 
the accuracy of our approach, we have performed the experiments of identifying packer on 200 
real-world malware for comparing between our approach with the binary signature technique 
adopted in CFF Explorer. The result shows that our technique produces the better detection.   
Keywords: concolic testing, packer, malware analysis, tf-idf, obfuscation techniques. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  Modern popular malwares are packed or obfuscated by packer to generate new invariants. 
According to [1, 2], 80 % of malware is packed by many kinds of packers. One popular example 
is EMDIVI virus, a notorious advanced persistent thread (APT) targeting on many organizations 
in Japan e.g. government agencies, local governments, banks and universities. This malware 
exploited the packer UPX.  
  The main goal of packer is to defeat the signature based technique of anti-virus softwares. 
It also increases the difficulty of the reverse engineering process since it often takes a very long 
time for unpacking or decrypting a packed file. As a counter solution, most of anti-virus 
software tends to detect packer signature for verifying the malware. Since malware can 
obfuscate the packer signature, this technique can be easily defeated. In general, the phase of 
identifying and unpacking packer takes a very important step. 
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  In general, we assume that each packer P can be represented a vector O of many 
obfuscation techniques O = (O1, O2,…, Ok) where Oi  is frequency of obfuscation technique i
th
 . 
Table 1 depicts the frequency of obfuscation techniques in each packer. For example, with 
packer APSACK, the frequency of Checksumming, CodeChunking and Indirect Jump are 49, 1 
and 12 respectively. However, when a malware F is packer by packer P, the frequency of 
obfuscation technique Oi is not exactly the same with the value of Table 1. The reason is that 
malware can accidently adopts these obfuscations itself which contaminates the frequency. 
Hence, to determine whether F is packed by P, the method of using the exact matching of 
frequency produces the low accuracy.  
For solving this problem, we propose a method as follows. 
 We develop a new weight         to determine the relevance of obfusaction technique O 
in packer P. Based on this weight, a packer is represented by a vector of         known 
as Vp. 
 For a test file F, we construct the vector of        , known as VF. Then, by calculating 
the similarity between two vectors VP and VF, we can determine whether F is packed by P. 
In this paper, we introduce a new approach of applying statistical approach to identify 
packers. Our key contributions are summarized as follows. 
 We have extended our tool, BE-PUM [4, 5] as a generic model generator with stubs of 
detecting obfuscation techniques. During the on-the-fly model generation, BE-PUM 
calculates the frequency of obfuscation techniques in each packer.  
 We propose a new weight, obfuscation technique frequency-inverse packer frequency 
(       ) for measuring the favourite obfuscation techniques in packer. Based on this 
weight, we construct a vector and calculate the similarity between targeted file and 
packer for packer identification.  
 We perform the experiments on 200 real malware for checking the effectiveness of our 
approach.  
The rest of this paper is organized as followed. Section 2 briefly describes the background 
knowledge of BE-PUM and packer. Section 3 describes the high-level overview of our method. 
Section 4 shows our experiments on 200 real-world malwares mainly collected from VirusTotal. 
The final section 5 discusses conclusion of our paper and some future works.  
Related works: There are many binary analysis tools, e.g. JakStab [6, 7], Syman [8] and 
BINCOA/OSMOSE [9], CodeSurfer/x86 [10], McVeto [11] and a commercial product, IDA Pro 
which is claimed to be one of the most popular and powerful tools for binary code analysis. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of existing research on packer 
identification.   
In industry, the approach of packer detection focuses on recognizing the occurrence of 
packer in targeted file. The main technique for this goal is to detect the packer signature often 
located in original entry point. This approach is used in many softwares, e.g., PEID and CFF 
Explorer. However, this technique can be easily evaded since malware can mutates the packer 
signature. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we present the basic concept of packers and BE-PUM.  
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2.1. Packer 
Packer is a software that can mutate a binary file into another executable. The new 
executable preserves the original file‟s functionality, but has a different content on the system 
for preventing the process of linking between them. Packers are used on executable for mainly 
two reasons: to reduce the size of binary file, and to evade analysis, reverse engineering, or 
detection. For the first reason, packer minimizes targeted file by compressing its content and 
then uncompressing it on-the-fly during the execution. This first feature of a packer is very 
popular in the scenario where the size of programs is large and minimizing file size is a critical 
task in early days of computer. However, existing real-world packers are used mainly for the 
second reason, i.e. to protect the original file from being observed, analyzed and tampered with. 
For achieving this goal, packer combines many obfuscation methods which include anti-
debugging, anti-cracking, anti-tracing, anti-reverse engineering, and more for preventing target 
file from straightforward analysis. These packers are used for protecting the licensed softwares 
or games from crackers. However, this feature is also exploited in malware for protecting them 
from detection of anti-virus software.  
From [1], 80 % of malwares use packing techniques for evading the detection. A popular 
approach to identify a packer is by a packer signature, which is a binary pattern of a part of a 
file. Similar to the binary signature matching in many commercial anti-virus software, it 
identifies a packer by finding a statistical binary pattern matching in packer signatures, as in 
well-known tools, e.g. CFF Explorer. However, when the technique of self-modification mutates 
the code layout to obfuscate the location of the header, it fails similar to commercial anti-virus 
software on polymorphic virus. 
2.1.1 Obfuscation techniques 
Packer supports many obfuscation techniques making binary code very difficult to explore. 
Inspired by [12], we categorize them into 6 groups as follows.  
 Entry/code placing obfuscation (Code layout): overlapping functions, overlapping 
blocks, and code chunking. 
 Self-modification code: Dynamic code which includes overwriting and 
packing/unpacking. 
 Instruction obfuscation: Indirect jump. 
 Anti-tracing: SEH (structural exception handling) and Special API 
(LoadLibrary@kernel32.dll and GetProcAddress@kernel32.dll) 
 Arithmetic operation: Obfuscated constants and checksumming. 
 Anti-tampering: Checksumming, timing check, anti-debugging, anti-rewriting, and 
hardware breakpoints. Anti-rewriting technique includes stolen bytes and checksumming  
2.2. BE-PUM 
We have been developing a tool BE-PUM [4, 5] (Binary Emulator for Pushdown Model 
generation), for generating a precise control flow graph (CFG) against obfuscation techniques of 
malware, e.g., indirect jump, self-modification, overlapping instructions, structured exception 
handler (SEH) and many obfuscation techniques adopted in packer. 
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2.2.1. The framework of BE-PUM 
BE-PUM implements CFG reconstruction based on concolic testing. Figure 1 shows the 
architecture of BE-PUM including three components: symbolic execution, binary emulation, and 
CFG storage. It computes a single step disassembly by applying JakStab 0.8.3 [10, 11] as a 
preprocessor . An SMT Z3.4.4 is supported as a backend engine to generate a test instance for 
concolic testing. The symbolic execution picks up state from the frontier and extends in on-the-
fly manner.  
2.2.2 Running Example 
        We illustrate the operation of BE-PUM with a small example in Figure 2. At a first look, 
the execution follows the looping path  P = (start → 0 → 1 → 2 → 3 → 4 → 1). However, the 
instruction at the location 3 overwrites the opcode at L1 + 1 which modifies the opcode at 1 
from EB 00 to EB 0A. The instruction “jmp L2” at 1 is modified to “jmp L3”. JakStab and IDA 
Pro fail to handle this obfuscation technique, whereas BE-PUM correctly generates  
(0, “xor eax eax”) → (1, “jmp L2”) → (2, “mov eax, offset l1 + 1”) → (3, “mov byte ptr [eax], 
0Eh”) → (4, “jmp L1”) → (1, “jmp L3”) → · · · 
      Continue from the location 5, there is a system call GetModuleHandleA at 9 and an indirect 
jump at 12. The API GetModuleHandleA at 9 is invoked with parameter 0. BE-PUM simulates 
its symbolic execution using JNA. The return value is stored in register eax. 
The path formula of (start → 0 → 1 → 2 → 3 → 4 → 1 → 5 → 6 → 8 → 9 → 10 → 11 → 
12) is (ebx == 1000). For handling the indirect jump at 12, BE-PUM adopts concolic testing by 
setting the value (ebx = 1000) (generated by Z3 4.3), and finds a new destination 14 (13 is dead 
node). 
2.2.3 BE-PUM as a generic unpacker tool 
     Preliminary version of BE-PUM can handle some typical obfuscation techniques of packers, 
e.g., indirect jump, self-modification, overlapping instructions, and structured exception handler 
(SEH). Inspired by [6], we have implemented many counter solutions for obfuscation techniques 
of packers which improves BE-PUM as a powerful general unpacker. Since most of malwares 
work in user mode, BEPUM just support user process level. It also supports symbolic binary 
emulation which makes BE-PUM a very effective de-obfuscation tool. We consider the SEH 
technique adopted in packer PETITE. 
 
404116         PUSH 4022E3 
40411B        PUSH DWORD PTR FS:[0] 
404122         MOV DWORD PTR FS:[0] , ESP 
       ………. 
       40421E        MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDI] , AL  
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Figure 1. The framework of BE-PUM. 
At 00404122, fs:[0x0] is overwritten with the pointer to malicious code (the value of esp). It 
then creates a fault condition by ”mov” at 0040421E. Since the value of register EDI is 0, the 
instruction at 0040421E overwrites the memory address at 00000000, which is protected by 
Windows operating system. This exception changes the control flow to 4022E3. BE-PUM can 
precisely trace this obfuscation technique while other tools fail.  
 
Figure 2. Running example of BE-PUM. 
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.BJFnt v1.3 0 3 937 0 40 208 0 57 0 0 0 0 0 0
ASPack v2.12 0 49 1 12 63 8 0 10 3 0 2 0 2 0
Exe Stealth 2.75a -> WebtoolMaster 1 1 5 15 57 1 0 23 0 3 0 0 3 0
EXEPACK 0 5 0 4 25 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
eXPressor 0 49 3 1 89 17 0 4 2 0 1 0 1 0
FSG v2.0 0 1 1 12 2 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0
LamCrypt v1.0 -> LaZaRuS 0 0 0 7 7 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0
MEW 11 SE v1.1 0 1 0 10 2 4 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0
MPESS 0 14 2 2 34 3 0 12 0 0 0 0 1 0
NoodleCrypt v2.00 (Eng) -> NoodleSpa 0 0 76 19 47 78 10 0 4 0 0 0 9 0
nPack v1.0 0 6 0 2 24 5 16 5 3 0 2 0 3 0
PECompact 2.0x Heuristic Mode -> Jeremy Collake0 1 1 16 60 8 0 11 10 1 2 0 2 0
Pencrypt 0 1 4 2 23 0 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 0
PEtite v2.1 0 57 2 8 115 16 0 15 7 2 0 0 1 0
RLPack 0 3 2 9 19 9 15 8 2 0 1 0 1 0
SafeDisc v4 0 0 1 2 5 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sramble 0 1 0 11 2 4 1 0 2 0 0 0 1 0
tElock 0.99 - 1.0 private -> tE! 0 18 24 22 167 105 5 0 6 20 2 0 1 0
Upack V0.37-V0.39 -> Dwing 0 10 1 19 19 1 2 3 2 0 0 0 1 0
UPX v3.0 0 5 0 4 25 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
WinUpack 0 10 1 19 19 1 2 3 2 0 0 0 1 0
WWPack32 v1.00, 0 0 1 0 13 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
Xcomp 0 36 3 7 37 18 16 6 1 0 1 0 1 0
y0da's Crypter v1.2 1 1 6 15 37 2 0 21 0 1 0 0 3 0
yoda's Crypter 1.3 -> Ashkbiz Danehkar 1 1 8 15 141 5 0 24 0 3 0 0 3 0
Current version of BE-PUM can unpack 25 different packers. The details are presented in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Frequency of obfuscation techniques in packer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. OUR STATISTICAL METHOD 
3.1. Power law 
       In statistics, a power law [13] is a relationship function between two quantities. When there 
is a relative change in one quantity, the other quantity varies proportional to the power. By 
determining suitable power proportion, one can generate a lot of different power law functions. 
Power law has been used widely in many fields. Among them, the most notorious application is 
Pareto principle [14], known as the 80:20 rule, which is very famous in industry. The 
proportional relationship between A and B of Pareto Principle is formulated as. 
    (
   
 
)   
   
 
  
Through changing the value of H, we can determine the appropriate proportion between A and B. 
       In addition, power law is also used in other fields e.g. physical, biological, and even 
criminal charges per convict. For computer science, the most important application of power law 
is Zipf's law [15]. Zipf's law usually refers to the “size” y of an occurrence of an event relative to 
its rank r. That is, the higher occurrence even y has, the higher rank y is belonged to. Zipf‟s law 
is used widely in text processing, where “size” denotes the frequency of use of the word a text, 
and “rank” is the importance of this word. Zipf's law states that the size of the rth largest 
occurrence of the event is inversely proportional to its rank: y ~ r
-b
, with b can be determined in 
many ways.  
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        In this paper, we adapt Zifp‟s law to introduce a new index for determining the obfuscation 
technique relevance in packer. Using the new index, we then can generate a new vector to 
represent a packer. This representation vector will be adopted to determine whether a malware is 
packed by packer.  
3.2. The         weight 
Given a packer T, we denote P = {P1, P2,…., Pn} a list of malwares which are packed by T, 
a set of obfuscation techniques O = (O1, O2,…, Ok) and a set of normal file NP = {NP1, NP2, … , 
NPm}, the         weight of a certain obfuscation technique Oi is defined as follows. 
 Frequency of an obfuscation technique O in a binary B  
           
     
        
            (1) 
where B can be either a packer pi or program NPi.         is total number of times O occurs in 
B and      is the obfuscation technique which has largest frequency in B. 
 Inverse-packer frequency of an obfuscation technique  
                                                
    
                   
         (2) 
where occ is the number of files in NP that O occurs.  
 Then 
                                   (3) 
The intuition of the         weight is that the more times packer P uses the obfuscation 
technique O, the more important O is to P. But if O is also used in many normal programs, the 
importance of O will reduce. In the ipf formula, the factor            is an adjustment to 
avoid division-by-zero.  
      Based on         weight, we propose a method of identifying packer which is described as 
follows.   
Step 1: For a target file F, generate the vector VF  
VF {                                           }      (4) 
Step 2: Generate the vector VT of packer T. 
VT {
∑              
 
 
 
 
∑              
 
 
 
   
∑              
 
 
 
}        (5) 
Step 3: If the Euclidean distance between these two vectors VF and VT is below the 
threshold  , we identifies that F is packed by T.  
                    (6) 
with   = 0.001. This value is chosen based on empirical study.  
3.3. Running Example 
       We consider 5 examples. Among them, 3 files (Demo1, Demo2 and Demo3) are packed by 
UPX and the others (Demo4 and Demo5) are normal programs i.e. these files are not packed. 
The frequencies of 5 files are described in Table 2.  
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Demo1 0 5 0 4 25 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Demo2 0 4 0 4 23 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Demo3 0 4 0 4 24 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Demo4 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
Demo5 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
AntiDebu
gging
Checksu
mming
CodeChu
nking
IndirectJ
ump
Obfuscat
edConst
Overlapp
ing Block
Overlapp
ing 
Function
Overwriti
ng
Packing/
Unpackin
g
SEH
Stolen 
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Timing 
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Hardwar
e BPX
Demo1 0 0.392157 0 0.313725 1.960784 0.078431 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.078431 0
Demo2 0 0.313725 0 0.313725 1.803922 0.078431 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.078431 0
Demo3 0 0.313725 0 0.313725 1.882353 0.078431 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.078431 0
Demo4 0 0 0 0.078431 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Demo5 0 0.078431 0 0 0.078431 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Value of otf°ipf
Name
       We examine the Indirect Jump (IJ) technique in Demo1. By applying the formulas (1) and 
(2) in 3.2, we calculate the following results. 
               
          
            
  
 
  
 = 0.16 
         
    
                    
  
 
         
 = 1.996 
Then                                       
 
Table 2. Frequency of obfuscation techniques in running examples. 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of         in each file are depicted in Table 3.  
Table 3.         value of obfuscation techniques in running examples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then the vector of packer VUPX = {0, 0.339869281, 0, 0.31372549, 1.882352941, 0.078431373, 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.078431373, 0}. 
We consider a target file F, VF = {0, 0.338859211, 0, 0.302725961, 1.872302442, 0.06343149, 
0.03, 0,  0, 0, 0, 0, 0.075451373, 0}. 
Applying (6), since d(VUPX, VF) = 0.633527347   then F is not packed by UPX. 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
4.1. Calculating the vector of         in each packers 
      We performed the experiments for 7 packers, UPX v3.0, ASPACK v2, FSG v2.0, NPACK 
v1.0, PECOMPACT v2.0x, YODA v1.3 and TELOCK 0.99. For other packers, we could not 
obtain enough samples. Table 4 below shows the numbers of the training set and normal 
program set for each packer. Note that the training set is taken from packed samples and real-
world malware which are known to be packed with the specified packer. Normal program means 
that this program is not packed by the specified packer. 
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ASPACK v2 0 0.43478 0 1.3913 0.47826 0.65217 0 0.13043 0 0 0 0 0.6087 0
FSG v2.0 0 0.72222 0.83333 0.05556 1.44444 0.55556 0 0.33333 0 0 0.44444 0 0.16667 0
NPACK v1.0 0 0.09091 0 0.27273 0.54545 0 0.18182 1.90909 0 0 0 0 0 0
PECOMPACT v2.0 0 0.18182 0 1.72727 0.18182 0 0.81818 0.81818 0 0 0.27273 0 0.63636 0
TELOCK v0.99 0 0.33333 0.38889 0.72222 1.77778 0.83333 0.33333 0.77778 0 0 0.27778 0.22222 0.77778 0
UPX v3.0 0 0.4827312 0 0.331721 1.939892 0.081828 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.082713 0
YODA v1.3 0.09091 0.63636 0.72727 0 1.09091 0.27273 0.72727 0.72727 0 0.45455 0.18182 0.18182 0.63636 0
Value of otf°ipf
Name
Table 4. Number of malware for experiments. 
Packer Name 
Training Set 
(Numbers) 
Set of Normal Program 
(Numbers) 
ASPACK v2 80 22 
FSG v2.0 84 20 
NPACK v1.0 71 22 
PECOMPACT v2.0 85 20 
TELOCK v0.99 76 18 
UPX v3.0 78 20 
YODA v1.3 88 25 
The vector of each packer is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5. Vector of         value in each packer. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2. Experiment on real-world malware 
4.2.1. Experimental setup 
       All experiments in this section are performed on Windows XP with AMD Athlon II X4 635, 
2.9 GHz and 8GB memory. We perform experiments of the packer identification on 200 real-
world malwares mainly collected from VirusTotal. According to the scan results of Virus Total 
Web service, 78 of these samples are downloaders, 90 are worms, and the rest are trojans.  
4.2.2. Experimental results  
      The packer identification of our approach succeeds on 200 malware. For checking the 
accuracy of our approach, we also compare our results with the binary signature technique. 
Table 6 presents the results of packer identification in BE-PUM. Clearly, our approach produces 
the better results compared with the method of binary signature using CFF Explorer. Although 
the differences between the binary signature and our approach are not very significant, there are 
some special cases worth mentioning.   
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Table 6. Experimental results. 
Packer Name Our approach Binary Signature 
ASPACK v2 14 10 
FSG v2.0 12 9 
NPACK v1.0 21 11 
PECOMPACT v2.0 14 12 
TELOCK v0.99 33 13 
UPX v3.0 92 83 
YODA v1.3 14 10 
 
Consider malware  034f9d2dc5627296141bb7d0a22032b1e8c7e47f266ada4a1da7f8dad05668b. 
Its binary code is “60 BE 00 E0 95 00 8D BE 00 30 AA FF C7” which is disassembly as follows.  
00A31B20 >  60             PUSHAD 
00A31B21   . BE 00E09500    MOV ESI,0034f9d2.0095E000 
00A31B26   . 8DBE 0030AAFF  LEA EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+FFAA3000] 
00A31B2C   . C787 D0566200 >MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+6256D0],2A8CFF11 
 
 
From the database of CFF Explorer, the signature of UPX 3.0 is “60 BE ?? ?? ?? 00 8D BE ?? 
?? ?? FF 57” with „ ??‟ indicates a wild card.  Obviously, the two binary codes differ at the final 
byte, C7 vs 57 which defeats the binary signature technique. However, our approach can detect 
this case.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper proposes a new approach on packer identification using statistical approach. We 
first develop BE-PUM as a generic unpacker tool with the obfuscation technique detection. 
During on-the-fly disassembly, BE-PUM measures the frequency of obfuscation techniques and 
extracts the obfuscation technique relevance in packer based on the new weight        . Using 
the vector of       we can calculate the distance for identifying packers. Experiment was 
performed on 200 malware collected from VirusTotal with 7 targeting packers to compare 
between our approach with the traditional approach. The accuracy of our approach outperforms 
the state-of-the-art tool CFF Exprolore. Although our experiment only covers 7 packers, it can 
be easily extended to cover other packers. It is the first future work. A main drawback is that our 
tool, BE-PUM is quite heavy which produces the slow processing time. Other future work is that 
we will improve the performance of our tool with multi-threaded implementation.     
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